At the outset of the golden era of cartography, fifteenth-century Europeans drew the earth as they wished it to be. Some maps were so fanciful as to show four continents like petals centered around Jerusalem. It would take a century of adventurers, navigators, mathematicians, and artists to align the map with the actual places where the rocks met the seas. In this effort, there were many lost voyages and sailors. Fictitious islands and isthmuses arose and fell. Yet even in their nascent form, the maps suggested important destinations and passages. They did not have to be perfect to be useful. Doubtless, there were times in the Age of Discovery when navigators were forced to choose between an old and dear map that had not been fully discredited, and a new and unknown picture of the world that remained yet unproved. How then did they decide which to trust?
This special section of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology is designed to explore this question with three review papers and a commentary all composed by leading psychopathologists, the navigators and cartographers of our discipline. For us, the old and dear map is derived from the classification systems connected with the neo-Kraepelinian movement in the psychiatry of the 1970s, such as the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1975) . Prior to this, the same symptoms could garner different diagnoses depending on what side of the Atlantic one experienced them (Wing, 1971) . For the neo-Kraepelinians, a lack of diagnostic reliability was the problem and surmounting this was a priority, even when it meant setting aside theories about the underlying causes of psychiatric disorders. Indeed, some argued that the psychoanalytically inflected and narrative descriptions of the two previous versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA; DSM I and II) were the underlying sources of unreliable diagnoses because they required interpreting the theory of the illness. The DSM-III, which drew more from the neo-Kraepelinian zeitgeist than from DSM-II, enshrined the official map of mental illness that continues to influence thinking today. Scientific instruments should be reliable, so an emphasis on reliability was an improvement well-heeled scientists supported.
For DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, and DSM-IV-TR, the emphasis on interrater reliability persisted. What did change was the number of ways in which the mind could go astray. There were 182 disorders in DSM-II, 265 in DSM-III, and 279 in DSM-IV. The primary criterion for introducing a disorder was an agreement that the syndrome impaired functioning, was seen as having clinical utility, and that the political machinery of the APA could be navigated to support inclusion. DSM-5 started out on a somewhat different course, at least in terms of the stated aims of its cochairs, David Kupfer and Darrel Regier (Kupfer, Regier, & Kuhl, 2008) . The fifth revision, it was hoped, would bring the manual into alignment with 30 years of research showing that the map of psychopathology was not well represented by hundreds of putatively distinct categories. Despite the efforts of the task force chairs, the board of trustees of the APA emphasized continuity over progress in their final decisions. For example, the dimensionally oriented assessment instruments developed for DSM-5 (e.g., Narrow et al., 2013) were placed into Section III as a set of "emerging measures and models." In the end, the DSM-5 became something more akin to a DSM-IV-TR-revised, as opposed to enshrining the new diagnostic paradigm the task force chairs originally sought. While there were several innovations, such as a chapter structure that better reflected data on the empirical organization of psychopathology (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 12-13) , the old map was largely retained with a few of the sea monsters relocated.
In April 2013, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Thomas Insel repudiated the political approach the APA used to construct the DSM, noting that group consensus and a putative focus on reliability no longer constituted a reasonable foundation for diagnosis in other areas of medicine. He concluded, "Patients with mental disorders deserve better [than the DSM-5]" (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/index.shtml). In the ensuing firestorm, the director issued a joint declaration with APA President-Elect Jeffrey Lieberman assuring the public that the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) . . . represents the best information currently available for clinical diagnosis of mental disorders" (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/ science-news/2013/dsm-5-and-rdoc-shared-interests.shtml). Nevertheless, NIMH's stated goal remains to move away from the DSM, and toward research aimed at a new map of the country within, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC).
The RDoC, explicitly so-named in homage to RDC, opens up the possibility of research unconstrained by the neo-Kraepelinian tradition (Insel & Cuthbert, 2011; Sanislow et al., 2010) . The potential explanatory power of dimensions arises as a natural consequence of replacing categorical diagnoses and pathogenic medical models of mental illness with a focus on variance in the brain's evolved behavioral programs. Far from providing polythetic inclusion criteria, RDoC appears to be removed from clinical phenomena. Instead, it seeks to systematize knowledge about mental processes and mental illness across multiple units of analysis. (Why not multiple levels of analysis? To avoid the implication that lower levels are privileged in the sense of providing a foundation for higher levels of analysis, which is one of many of its authors' efforts to avoid the appearance of being reductionists.) How to accomplish the goal of organizing knowledge about mental illness into a new, coherent map of the country within is far from obvious. It is increasingly likely that, at least in terms of NIMH -supported research, RDoC will provide the rough sketch; as such, it will govern how a lot of subsequent expeditions are organized. Therefore it is timely to ask: is the sketch right, and if so what kind of map will result from RDoC?
A pressing question then is how to determine the appropriate level of description for organizing the findings of the diversity of research on mental illnesses and addictions. Berenbaum's article (2013) draws attention immediately to the primacy of experience as a foundational aspect of mental illness, and contrasts this with a perceived elevation of speculative neuroscientific explanations in RDoC. Within the DSM scheme, experience is translated into (generally patient-reported) symptoms. In their commentary, Cuthbert and Kozak (2013) address this as an issue of "granularity." Here they unpack the tacit hypothesis within RDoC that (a) selecting the right level of granularity for psychopathology will clarify the relationship between different units of analysis (genes, neural systems, cognitive and affective functions and symptoms), and that (b) the right level of granularity is at the level of cognitive constructs (e.g., Negative Valence-Frustrative NonReward), which may afford a more coherent link between biological and experiential phenomena, although there may be many intermediate steps between. The reader is challenged to weigh the evidence and decide for him or herself.
At its core, RDoC aims to focus research along the brain's evolved behavioral programs. To this end, it now relies in large part on the recent efforts of six panels of mostly North American experts. While the brain may be elegant, the sciences of its evolved behavioral programs are thorny. Similarly, in the Age of Discovery mapmakers had to grapple with the incoherent discoveries of different expeditions, make educated guesses about where coastlines connected, and decide which reports to down-weight as less veridical. Knowledge about the mind and the brain and how it breaks down in mental illness comes from many quarters, and it is not easily systematized by scholarly committees. How then do we move from rational categorization of these panels to vertically integrated constructs of the kind suggested by the RDoC Matrix?
The special section suggests some contrasting perspectives on this challenge. Patrick and colleagues (2013) highlight the challenge to the rationalistic approach of RDoC so far. That is, that the empirical data from one unit of analysis are often not amenable to theories generated at a different unit of analysis. To illustrate they provide the modern demonstration of the principles underlying the need to "bootstrap"-going back and forth between theory and data collection at different units-the measures and descriptions needed to provide a coherent, translationally integrated construct. Bilder and colleagues (2013) suggest an alternative (or complementary) approach, which might be characterized as doubling-down on rational categorization. In this article, they characterize how the use of informatics and "big data," properly characterized, might provide a coherent way to map the contours of the brain's evolved behavioral programs. These templates are useful for envisioning the ways in which RDoC will be shaped in subsequent revisions.
The special section cannot touch upon all the new issues that will arise as the field endures an era characterized by more diverse and competing paradigms than in the past. It will be an era in which one foot is on an outmoded and largely categorical iceberg (Section II of DSM-5, called "diagnostic criteria and codes") with dimensional innovations around the edges (Section III of DSM-5, called "emerging measures and models). The other foot will be on a nascent, multidimensional RDoC iceberg focused on catalyzing novel research, as opposed to providing a system suited to clinical application. The bergs will inevitably float in different directions. One issue we leave for the reader's imagination will be the consequence of having a research world that uses a nosological system that is increasingly divorced from clinical practice and its economic realities (e.g., the perceived need for category labels in filling out reimbursement forms).
Another issue we leave for the future is the looming problem of measurement. For example, the challenge of measuring specific deficits in the various evolved behavioral programs delineated on the RDoC Matrix will become more prominent as the RDoC agenda moves forward. Furthermore, relating neural processes to psychopathology will continue to be a problem as associations between these specific processes and symptoms are likely to be smaller than the associations observed between more global (and less mechanistically precise) measures and symptoms. Is the field able to survive the disappointments that will ensue if specific construct measures have smaller effect sizes and are less clinically relevant? There will also remain a number of scientificoadministrative issues. How can RDoC be built and nourished in the broader community to survive any future changes in leadership within NIMH? How will it spread within the auspices of the U.S. National Institute of Health (because right now it exists within only a single institute, NIMH), and how will its perspectives be incorporated beyond the narrow confines of a single government bureau in a single North American country?
The discussion engendered herein takes several steps toward mapping the country within. It will be useful for those trying to come to grips with the implications for their research of these new classification systems, particularly RDoC. It will also be useful for those who wish to look to the gusts and storms of the future to understand the potential for what an RDoC-derived map may one day provide.
